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Abstract
The literature on dynamic discrete games often assumes that the conditional choice proba-
bilities and the state transition probabilities are homogeneous across markets and over time. We
refer to this as the “homogeneity assumption” in dynamic discrete games. This homogeneity
assumption enables empirical studies to estimate the game’s structural parameters by pooling
data from multiple markets and from many time periods. In this paper, we propose a hypothesis
test to evaluate whether the homogeneity assumption holds in the data. Our hypothesis is the
result of an approximate randomization test, implemented via a Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) algorithm. We show that our hypothesis test becomes valid as the (user-defined)
number of MCMC draws diverges, for any fixed number of markets, time-periods, and players.
We apply our test to the empirical study of the U.S. Portland cement industry in Ryan (2012).
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1 Introduction
In applications of dynamic discrete games, practitioners often assume that the conditional choice
probabilities and the state transition probabilities are invariant across time and markets.1 We
refer to this as the “homogeneity assumption” in dynamic discrete games. This is a convenient
assumption, as it allows the estimation of the model’s structural parameters by pooling data from
multiple markets and from many time periods.
Despite the widespread use of the homogeneity assumption in dynamic discrete games, it is
plausible for this condition to fail in applications. We now provide a few examples. First, a
game could suffer from a structural change, which would invalidate the homogeneity assumption
across time. Second, markets could be affected by permanent time-invariant heterogeneity that is
observed to the players but not to the econometrician (e.g., Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011). This
would invalidate the homogeneity assumption across markets. Third and relatedly, there may be
multiplicity of equilibria, and different markets could be playing different equilibria. The literature
has considered hypothesis testing for the multiplicity of equilibria in games. In particular, de Paula
and Tang (2012) propose a test for the multiplicity of equilibria across markets in static games,
while Otsu, Pesendorfer, and Takahashi (2016) consider a test for the multiplicity of equilibria
across markets in dynamic games.
In this paper, we propose a hypothesis test for the homogeneity assumption. Our test is im-
plemented via Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, and it is justified by the theory of
randomization tests (cf. Lehmann and Romano, 2005, Section 15.2). While our test is not exactly
a randomization test, we establish its validity by coupling it with an underlying randomization
test. The latter is exactly valid yet computationally infeasible. In this sense, we can interpret our
proposed MCMC algorithm as a computationally feasible way to implement the infeasible random-
ization test. We formally show that the approximation error vanishes as the (user-defined) number
of MCMC draws diverges. It is worth mentioning that our results hold for any fixed and finite
number of players, markets, and time periods. This is an important aspect of our contribution, as
the datasets used in empirical applications often have a small number of time periods and markets.
For example, our empirical application is based on Ryan (2012), and has only n = 23 markets and
either T = 9 or T = 10 time periods.
The econometric framework considered in this paper is arguably very general. It includes
the single-agent dynamic discrete choice model (e.g., Rust (1987); Hotz and Miller (1993); Hotz,
Miller, Sanders, and Smith (1994); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)) and the Markov equilibrium
dynamic game model (e.g., Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007);
Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007); Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008, 2010)). Furthermore,
1In this paper, we use “market” to denote a cross-sectional unit.
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it includes the Markov dynamic game model of Aguirregabiria and Magesan (2020), which allows
some players to have biased beliefs.
In a recent paper, Otsu et al. (2016) propose several hypothesis tests for dynamic discrete games.
Some of their proposals are related to the problem considered in this paper. Specifically, they
consider a method to test the homogeneity across markets of the conditional choice probabilities
and the state transition probabilities, under the maintained assumption that these functions are
time-homogeneous. Their inference method is based on the bootstrap, and its validity is shown in
an asymptotic framework in which the number of time periods T diverges to infinity. Unfortunately,
the number of time periods in applications is often small. Besides the aforementioned application
of Ryan (2012) with T = 9 or T = 10, we can mention Sweeting (2013) with T = 4, Collard-Wexler
(2013) with T = 24, and Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu (2013) with T = 5.
The most critical step of our MCMC algorithm is based on the so-called Euler algorithm (Kan-
del, Yossi, Unger, and Winkler, 1996). In related work, Besag and Mondal (2013) use this algorithm
to test whether a time series of data has a time-homogeneous Markov structure. In terms of our
setup, this corresponds to testing whether the data from a single market has a time-homogeneous
state transition probability. Relative to this work, our paper incorporates several essential features
of dynamic Markov discrete games. First, we recognize that the dataset in a typical dynamic game
has information about actions and states. Second, our construction exploits the typical economic
structure imposed in dynamic games, such as the conditional independence assumption (i.e., con-
ditional on the current state variable, the current action variable is independent from the past
information). This can be clearly evidenced in our MCMC algorithm, where we first transform
the state variable data and then we transform the action variable data. Finally, while Besag and
Mondal (2013) focus on data from a single market, our MCMC algorithm exploits the possibility
that the data includes observations from multiple markets.2 This is an important aspect of our con-
tribution, as the datasets used in empirical applications usually include data multiple markets, e.g.,
Ryan (2012) with n = 23, Sweeting (2013) with n = 102, Collard-Wexler (2013) with n = 1, 600,
and Dunne et al. (2013) with n = 639.
We explore the performance of our hypothesis test in Monte Carlo simulations. Our results
show that our method provides excellent size control even in small samples, and can successfully
detect relatively small deviations from the homogeneity hypothesis. In these two accounts, our test
appears to work favorably in comparison with the bootstrap-based test in Otsu et al. (2016). As an
empirical application, we investigate the homogeneity of the decisions in the U.S. Portland cement
industry data used in Ryan (2012). This is a key assumption in Ryan (2012), as it allows him to
2Besag and Mondal (2013, Section 5) briefly mentions how their methods could be extended to the multiple
market case. Unfortunately, they do not explain how this can be implemented nor they justify its validity. In
contrast, the hypothesis test that we propose is the result of a different procedure than theirs, and we prove its
validity by connecting it with the theory of randomization tests.
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pool data from multiple markets to estimate the model’s parameters. Unlike Otsu et al. (2016)’s
test, our test finds no evidence against the homogeneity hypothesis in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic discrete choice
model and the hypothesis test. Section 3 specifies our hypothesis test and its implementation via
the MCMC algorithm. In Section 4, we show that our test is an approximate implementation of
a computationally infeasible randomization test. In Section 5, we evaluate the performance of our
test in finite samples via Monte Carlo simulations. Section 6 considers an empirical application
based on Ryan (2012). Section 7 concludes. The paper’s appendix collects all of the proofs, several
auxiliary results, and computational details related to the proposed MCMC algorithm.
2 The econometric model and the testing problem
2.1 The econometric model
We begin by describing the dynamic discrete game under consideration. We observe the outcome
of n markets in which J players choose actions over T time periods. Our setup allows for J = 1,
i.e., single-agent problems, or J > 1, i.e., multiple-agent games. This paper’s inference results are
valid for all finite n, T , and J .
We consider a setup in which the observed actions and state variables are discretely distributed,
which is common in the dynamic discrete choice literature. For every market i = 1, . . . , n and
period t = 1, . . . , T , let Ai,t be the random variable that specifies the actions chosen by the players
in market i and period t, and let Si,t be the random variable that specifies the state variable of
market i and period t. We define the following n× T matrices:
S ≡ (Si,t : i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, . . . , T ),
A ≡ (Ai,t : i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, . . . , T ).
In this notation, the data are then given by
X ≡ (S,A).
We assume the common support of Si,t is a finite set S, and the common support of Ai,t is a
finite set A. Then, the support of X is represented by X ≡ SnT ×AnT .
Remark 2.1. We have thus far assumed that we observe a balanced panel, i.e., all n markets are
fully observed over T time periods. This is only for the simplicity of notation and exposition. All
of the arguments in our paper extend immediately to the case in which each market i = 1, . . . , n is
observed over a market-specific time period Ti.
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Throughout this paper, we maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The following conditions hold:
(a) ((Si,t, Ai,t) : t = 1, . . . , T ) are independent across i = 1, . . . n.
(b) (Si,t, Ai,t) and (Si,1, Ai,1, . . . , Si,t−2, Ai,t−2) are conditionally independent given (Si,t−1, Ai,t−1)
for every i = 1, . . . , n and t = 3, . . . T .
(c) Ai,t and (Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) are conditionally independent given Si,t for every i = 1, . . . , n and
t = 2, . . . T .
Assumption 2.1 is standard in much of the literature on dynamic discrete games. Assumption
2.1(a) imposes that markets are independently distributed. Assumption 2.1(b) indicates that the
observations of state and actions are a Markov process. Assumption 2.1(c) imposes that the current
actions are independent of past information once we condition on the current state. Assumptions
2.1(b)-(c) are high-level restrictions that are typically imposed on the equilibrium strategies used
by the players. In particular, they follow from the assumption that players use Markov strategies
Maskin and Tirole (2001), as assumed in Pakes et al. (2007); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007);
Bajari et al. (2007); Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). These conditions are implied even
in models in which the players’ beliefs are allowed to be out of equilibrium, i.e., do not coincide
with the true equilibrium probabilities (e.g., Aguirregabiria and Magesan (2020)).
We now introduce necessary notation to express our hypothesis of interest. We use σi,t to denote
the conditional choice probability for market i and period t, i.e., for every (s, a) ∈ S ×A,
σi,t(a|s) ≡ P (Ai,t = a|Si,t = s).
We use gi,t+1 to denote the state transition probability from period t to t+ 1 for market i, i.e., for
every (s, a, s′) ∈ S ×A× S ,
gi,t+1(s
′|a, s) ≡ P (Si,t+1 = s′|(Si,t, Ai,t) = (s, a)).
We use mi(s) to denote the marginal state distribution for market i in period 1, i.e., for every
s ∈ S,
mi(s) ≡ P (Si,1 = s).
With this notation in place, we specify our hypothesis testing problem in the next section.
2.2 The hypothesis testing problem
Our goal is to test whether the “homogeneity assumption” holds in the data, i.e., whether the
conditional choice probabilities and state transition probabilities are homogeneous across time and
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markets. That is,
H0 : σi,t(a|s) = σ(a|s) and gi,t+1(s′|a, s) = g(s′|a, s) vs. H1 : H0 is false. (1)
Note that H0 in (1) represents two types of homogeneity: time and market homogeneity, and
involves two functions: conditional choice probabilities and state transition probabilities. In this
sense, our hypothesis test evaluates four homogeneity conditions: time homogeneity of the con-
ditional choice probabilities, market homogeneity of the conditional choice probabilities, time ho-
mogeneity of the state transition probabilities, and market homogeneity of the state transition
probabilities. A rejection of H0 in (1) would be indicative that one or more of these homogeneity
conditions is violated. In certain applications, however, one may feel comfortable that some of
the conditions are satisfied and should be part of our maintained assumptions. For example, in a
given application, one may be confident that the conditional choice probability and state transition
probability are time-homogeneous. Then, one could reinterpret H0 in (1) as testing the market
homogeneity of the conditional choice probabilities and state transition probabilities.
Under Assumption 2.1 and H0 in (1), Lemma B.1 in the appendix shows that the likelihood of
the data X = (S,A) evaluated at any realization X˜ = (S˜, A˜) ∈ X is as follows:
P (X = X˜) =
n∏
i=1
(
mi(S˜i,1)
(
T∏
t=1
σ(A˜i,t|S˜i,t)
) (
T−1∏
t=1
g(S˜i,t+1|S˜i,t, A˜i,t)
))
. (2)
This expression reveals that the markets are independently distributed (Assumption 2.1(a)), but
they are not necessarily identically distributed because mi(·) depends on i. Even though the con-
ditional choice probabilities and state transition probabilities are homogeneous under H0, markets
can still be heterogeneous due to differences in their initial state values. This is a desired feature
in our testing problem, as the dynamic discrete choice literature usually allows the initial state
distribution to be market-specific.
3 Our hypothesis test
In this paper, we propose to reject H0 in (1) whenever the significance level α is larger than or
equal to our p-value, which we denote by pˆK . That is,
φK(X) ≡ 1{pˆK ≤ α}. (3)
In turn, our p-value pˆK is the result of constructing K transformations of the data via our MCMC
algorithm, which we describe in Section 3.1 (see Algorithm 3.1). Our MCMC algorithm produces
K sequential transformations of the data X, denoted by (X(1), . . . , X(K)). Our p-value is then
computed as follows
pˆK ≡ 1
K
K∑
k=1
1{τ(X(k)) ≥ τ(X)}, (4)
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where τ : X → R denotes the test statistic designed to detect departures from H0 in the data.3
One notable feature of our hypothesis test its validity will not depend on the choice of the test
statistic. The following is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.1. Under H0 in (1), the test in (3) satisfies
lim sup
K→∞
E[φK(X)] ≤ α, (5)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness in (X,X(1), . . . , X(K)), i.e., both in
the data X and in the random draws (X(1), . . . , X(K)) generated by our MCMC algorithm.
Theorem 3.1 establishes that the proposed test in (3) controls size as the length of the MCMC
draws diverges. While this is an approximate result for a finite K, we note that the researcher
controls the number of MCMC draws and that the approximation error becomes negligible by
choosing a large value of K. Remarkably, Theorem 3.1 holds regardless of the number of markets
n, time periods T , and players J , which can remain constant in our analysis. In addition and
as promised, this result also holds irrespective of the specific choice of test statistic τ used in the
construction of the p-value in (4).
Our proposed test can be related to randomization tests, e.g., Lehmann and Romano (2005,
Chapter 15.2). In particular, Theorem 3.1 follows from showing that the p-value in (4) approximates
the p-value of a (computationally infeasible) randomization test for H0 in (1). This observation
provides intuition as to why Theorem 3.1 does not require the number of markets n, time periods
T , or players J to grow. We provide a detailed explanation and additional results in Section 4. In
the rest of this section, we introduce the MCMC algorithm used to construct (X(1), . . . , X(K)).
3.1 The MCMC algorithm
Our MCMC algorithm requires some notation. Let I = {I1, I2} denote an arbitrary pair of markets
I1 and I2 in the data, i.e., I1, I2 = 1, 2, . . . , n. We allow for I1 = I2. We use I to denote the
collection of all such pairs of markets, i.e., |I| = n2. We also define several sets.
Definition 3.1. For any I ∈ I and S˘ ∈ SnT , RS(I, S˘) is the set of all S˜ ∈ SnT satisfying the
following conditions:
(a) S˜i,1 = S˘i,1 for all i = 1, . . . , n,
(b)
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˜i,t = s, S˜i,t+1 = s′} =
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s′} for all s, s′ ∈ S and i ∈ Ic,
(c)
∑
i∈I
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˜i,t = s, S˜i,t+1 = s′} =
∑
i∈I
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s′} for all s, s′ ∈ S.
3For example, (20) in Section 5 considers two possible test statistics designed to detect departures from market
homogeneity in the conditional choice probability function.
7
In words, RS(I, S˘) is the set of all state configurations that result from “mixing” the hypo-
thetical state data S˘, subject to certain restrictions (given by conditions (a)-(c)). Under H0, these
restrictions imply that each state configuration in RS(I, S˘) has the same value of the likelihood
function, provided that it is paired with a suitable action configuration. The corresponding suitable
action configurations are precisely those in next definition.
Definition 3.2. For any S˜, S˘ ∈ SnT and A˘ ∈ AnT , RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)) is the set of all A˜ ∈ AnT satisfying
the following conditions:
(a)
∑n
i=1
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˜i,t = s, A˜i,t = a, S˜i,t+1 = s′} =
∑n
i=1
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, A˘i,t = a, S˘i,t+1 = s′}
for all s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A,
(b)
∑n
i=1 1{S˜i,T = s, A˜i,T = a} =
∑n
i=1 1{S˘i,T = s, A˘i,T = a} for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A.
By definition, RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)) is the set of action configurations that result from “mixing” “mix-
ing” the hypothetical action data A˘, subject to certain restrictions (given by conditions (a)-(b)).
Under H0, these restrictions imply that the hypothetical data (S˘, A˘) has the same likelihood as the
state configuration S˜ paired with any action configuration in RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)). With these definitions
in place, we can now specify our MCMC algorithm.
Algorithm 3.1 (MCMC algorithm). Let (X(1), . . . , X(K)) denote the following Markov chain.
Initiation. Initiate the chain with X(1) = X.
Iteration. The rest of the chain is iteratively generated as follows. For any k = 2, . . . ,K and given
(X(1), . . . , X(k−1)), X(k) = (S(k), A(k)) is a randomly generated as follows:
Step 1: Draw I(k) uniformly from I, independently of (X(1), . . . , X(k−1)).
Step 2: Given (X(1), . . . , X(k−1), I(k)), draw S(k) uniformly from RS(I(k), S(k−1)).
Step 3: Given (X(1), . . . , X(k−1), I(k), S(k)), draw A(k) uniformly from RA(S(k), X(k−1)). 
Several comments are in order. Steps 2 and 3 require randomly drawing state and action
configurations uniformly over the sets RS(I
(k), S(k−1)) and RA(S(k), X(k−1)), respectively. On the
one hand, Step 3 is relatively easy to implement by permuting the action data in A(k−1) subject to
the restrictions in RA(S
(k), X(k−1)). Algorithm A.3 in Section A.2 explains how to implement this
in practice and provides a justification (Lemma A.5). On the other hand, Step 2 is more involved.
We propose to implement it using a modified version of the Euler algorithm (Kandel et al., 1996;
Besag and Mondal, 2013). Section A.1 describes the original Euler algorithm (Algorithm A.1), our
modification (Algorithm A.2), and formally shows that the latter satisfy Step 2 in Lemma A.2.
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For any k = 2, . . . ,K, X(1), . . . , X(k−1) ∈ X , I ∈ I, and X˜ = (S˜, A˜) ∈ X , our MCMC algorithm
implies the following transition probabilities:
P (I(k) = I | X(1), . . . , X(k−1)) = 1|I| , (6)
P (S(k) = S˜ | I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1)) = 1{S˜ ∈ RS(I
(k), S(k−1))}
|RS(I(k), S(k−1))|
, (7)
P (A(k) = A˜ | S(k), I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1)) = 1{A˜ ∈ RA(S
(k), X(k−1))}
|RA(S(k), X(k−1))|
. (8)
Note that (7) and (8) are well defined, as both denominators can be shown to be positive. In
turn, these transition probabilities imply that our MCMC algorithm has the following transition
probability:
P (X(k) = X˜ | X(1), . . . , X(k−1)) =
∑
I∈I
1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S(k−1)), A˜ ∈ RA(S˜,X(k−1))}
|I| × |RS(I, S(k−1))| × |RA(S˜,X(k−1))|
if |RS(I, S(k−1))| × |RA(S˜,X(k−1))| > 0,
0 otherwise.
(9)
4 Our test as an approximate randomization test
This section provides the formal arguments that are necessary to prove Theorem 3.1 and, thus,
justify our hypothesis test in (3). In particular, we show that our MCMC-based p-value in (4) is an
approximation of the p-value of a specific randomization test. We argue that this randomization
test is valid in finite samples but computationally infeasible, which explains why we propose the
MCMC algorithm to approximate its p-value.
This section is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides an alternative representation of the
likelihood of the data under H0 in (1). This result allows us to define a sufficient statistic of the data
under H0, denoted by U(X). Section 4.2 introduces a transformation group of the data, which does
not change the value of the sufficient statistic U(X).4 Section 4.3 defines a specific randomization
test for (1), and argues that is both finite-sample valid and computationally infeasible. Section 4.4
shows that our MCMC-based test in (3) can successfully approximate the infeasible randomization
test as the number of MCMC draws diverges.
4.1 An alternative representation of the likelihood
The following result provides an alternative representation of the likelihood under H0 in (1).
4Hereafter, we use “transformation group” to denote the set defined in Lehmann and Romano (2005, pages 693-4).
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Lemma 4.1. Under Assumption 2.1 and H0 in (1), the likelihood of the data X = (S,A) evaluated
at X˜ = (S˜, A˜) ∈ X with S˜ = (S˜i,t : i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, . . . , T ) ∈ SnT and A˜ = (A˜i,t : i = 1, . . . , n, t =
1, . . . , T ) ∈ AnT is
P (X = X˜) = P (A = A˜|S = S˜) × P (S = S˜), (10)
where
P (A = A˜|S = S˜) =
∏
(s,a,s′)∈S×A×S
(
σ(a|s)g(s′|s, a)∑
a˜∈A g(s′|a˜, s)σ(a˜|s)
)∑n
i=1
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˜i,t=s,A˜i,t=a,S˜i,t+1=s′}
×
∏
(s,a)∈S×A
σ(a|s)
∑n
i=1 1{S˜i,T=s,A˜i,T=a} (11)
and
P (S = S˜) =
(
n∏
i=1
mi(S˜i,1)
)
×
∏
(s,s′)∈S×S
(∑
a∈A
g(s′|a, s)σ(a˜|s)
)∑n
i=1
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˜i,t=s,S˜i,t+1=s′}
. (12)
From this result, we can deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Under Assumption 2.1 and H0 in (1), the sufficient statistic for X = (S,A) is
U(X) =

(Si,1 : i = 1 . . . , n) ,(∑n
i=1
∑T−1
t=1 1{Si,t = s,Ai,t = a, Si,t+1 = s′} : (s, a, s′) ∈ S ×A× S
)
,
(
∑n
i=1 1{Si,T = s,Ai,T = a} : (s, a) ∈ S ×A)
 . (13)
Corollary 4.1 implies that, under H0, any transformation of the data that does not change the
value of U(X) does not affect the value of the likelihood. This observation provides the basis of
the randomization test that we consider in the remaining sections.
4.2 A transformation group related to the proposed MCMC algorithm
Our proposed MCMC algorithm can be understood as an iteration of transformations to the data
X. In particular, X(1) = X is the identity transformation, X(2) follows from applying Steps 1-3
to X, X(3) follows from applying Steps 1-3 twice to X, and so forth. In this section, we define a
transformation group that is related to the transformations in our MCMC algorithm. To define
this properly, we first require the following definition.
Definition 4.1. For any pair of markets I = {I1, I2} ∈ I, let G(I) denote the set of all transfor-
mations of X onto itself such that, for any g ∈ G(I) and (S˘, A˘) ∈ X , (S˜, A˜) = g(S˘, A˘) satisfies
S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)).
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Lemma B.3 in the appendix shows that G(I) is a transformation group. By Definition 4.1, G(I)
is the group representation of Steps 2-3 of our MCMC algorithm. Given a randomly chosen pair of
markets I(k) in Step 1, Steps 2-3 obtain the next element of the Markov chain X(k) = (S(k), A(k))
by applying a randomly chosen transformation in G(I(k)) to the preceding element of the Markov
chain, X(k−1). In this sense, Steps 2-3 of our MCMC algorithm are a specific way of choosing a
particular transformation in G(I(k)).
By the description in the previous paragraph, our MCMC algorithm randomly chooses trans-
formations in G(I) for random pairs of markets I, and iteratively applies them to the data. These
iterative transformations are related to the set that we define next.
Definition 4.2. Let G be the set of all finitely many compositions of the elements in
⋃
I∈IG(I).
The next result states that G is a transformation group with desirable properties.
Lemma 4.2. G : X → X is a transformation group of X such that, for any g ∈ G and X˜ ∈ X , X˜
and gX˜ have the same sufficient statistic in (13), i.e., U(X˜) = U(gX˜).
The properties shown in Lemma 4.2 imply that we can use G to define a valid randomization
test. We do this in Section 4.3.
4.3 A randomization test
Following Lehmann and Romano (2005, Chapter 15.2), we can use the transformation group G to
define a randomization test. This test rejects H0 in (1) whenever the significance level α is larger
than or equal to the randomization p-value, which we denote by pˆ. That is,
φ(X) ≡ 1{pˆ ≤ α}, (14)
where
pˆ ≡ 1|G|
∑
g∈G
1{τ(gX) ≥ τ(X)}. (15)
By the arguments in Lehmann and Romano (2005, Page 636), the randomization test in (14) is
finite-sample valid. We record this in the next result.
Lemma 4.3. Under H0 in (1) and for any α ∈ (0, 1), the test in (14) satisfies
E[φ(X)] ≤ α. (16)
Unlike our proposed test in (3), the hypothesis test in (14) is computationally infeasible in
typical applications of dynamic discrete choice games. The basic reason is that the transformation
group G is usually impossible to enumerate. To see why, note that G is a set of transformations
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restricted by the condition on the sufficient statistics in (13). This condition is hard to impose
without explicitly verifying that it holds. In turn, an explicit verification of this condition is not
practically feasible, as it would require exploring all possible transformations that map X to X .
Even in applications in which n, T , and |A| and |S| are relatively small, the resulting state space
of the data X = SnT ×AnT can be overwhelming.
In the randomization testing literature, it is not uncommon for the transformation set G to
be huge. As Lehmann and Romano (2005, page 636) explains, one can still implement a random
version of the test in (14) by drawing randomly from G in a uniform fashion. This point is routinely
exploited in standard settings to construct tests based on permutations or sign changes. To the
best of our knowledge, however, there is no feasible way of obtaining such random draws in the
current setup, as the condition on the sufficient statistics in (13) is hard to impose without explicitly
checking whether it holds. This explains why we cannot directly exploit the finite-sample result in
Lemma 4.3. In any case, Section 4.4 reveals that our MCMC-based p-value in (4) approximates
the infeasible p-value in (15) as the length of the MCMC diverges.
4.4 An MCMC approximation to the randomization test
Our main theoretical result is Theorem 3.1, which shows that the test in (3) controls size as the
number of MCMC draws K diverges to infinity. The following lemma provides a fundamental
stepping stone to prove this result.
Lemma 4.4. Conditional on X,
sup
t∈R
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1K
K∑
k=1
1{τ(X(k)) ≥ t} − 1|G|
∑
g∈G
1{τ(gX) ≥ t}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ a.s.→ 0 as K →∞.
Lemma 4.4 shows that, as the number of MCMC draws diverges, the conditional distribution
based on the MCMC algorithm converge to the conditional distribution of the computationally
infeasible randomization test described in Section 4.3. By applying Lemma 4.4 with t = τ(X), we
can deduce that the p-value in (4) approximates the p-value in (15) as the number of MCMC draws
K diverges. That is, conditional on X,
pˆK
a.s.→ pˆ as K →∞.
By combining this observation with the finite-sample validity of the infeasible randomization test
in (14) (Lemma 4.3), it follows that our proposed MCMC-test becomes valid as the number of
MCMC draws K diverges. This argument provides the intuition behind Theorem 3.1 (see Section
A.3 of the appendix for the proof), and why it holds regardless of the number of markets n, time
periods T , and players J .
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5 Monte Carlo simulations
In this section, we explore the performance of our proposed test in Monte Carlo simulations. We
consider the Monte Carlo design used by Otsu et al. (2016, Section 4), which follows from the
dynamic oligopoly discrete game in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008, Section 7.1). We refer
to these papers for the details on the setup. The simulated data are generated by two oligopolic
firms deciding whether to enter or not into n markets, and over T time periods. This dynamic game
has multiple equilibria, which we exploit to generate departures from the homogeneity assumption.
In each period t = 1, . . . , T and market i = 1, . . . , n, there are four possible actions in this game:
Ai,t = 1 denotes that neither firm entered the market, Ai,t = 2 denotes that only firm 2 enters,
Ai,t = 3 denotes that only firm 1 enters, and Ai,t = 4 denotes that both firms enter. This implies
that A = {1, 2, 3, 4}. In addition, the state is equal to the last period’s action, i.e.,
Si,t = Ai,t−1, (17)
and so S = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Note that (17) implies that the state transition probabilities are homoge-
neous, and given by
gi,t+1(s
′|a, s) = 1{s′ = a}. (18)
We presume that (18) is known to the researcher, who replaces H0 in (1) with the homogeneity of
the conditional choice probabilities. In other words, the relevant hypothesis testing problem is
H0 : σi,t(a|s) = σ(a|s) vs. H1 : H0 is false. (19)
Following Otsu et al. (2016, Eq. (4), (7)), we consider the following test statistics
τ1(X) ≡
n∑
i=1
∑
(a,s)∈A×S
(σˆi(a|s)− σˆ(a|s))2
(∑T
t=1 1{Si,t = s}
σˆ(a|s)
)
τ2(X) ≡ 2
n∑
i=1
∑
(a,s)∈A×S
σˆi(a|s) log
(
σˆi(a|s)
σˆ(a|s)
) T∑
t=1
1{Si,t = s}, (20)
where we interpret 0/0 = 0 and 0× log(0) = 0, and we define
σˆi(a|s) ≡
∑T
t=1 1{Ai,t = a, Si,t = s}∑T
t=1 1{Si,t = s}
σˆ(a|s) ≡
∑n
i=1
∑T
t=1 1{Ai,t = a, Si,t = s}∑n
i=1
∑T
t=1 1{Si,t = s}
.
The statistics in (20) compute weighted differences between market-specific empirical conditional
choice probabilities and the overall counterpart.
The data produced by this game is a matrix X = (S,A) ∈ X constructed exactly as in Otsu
et al. (2016, Section 4). We simulate data from a mixture of two data generating processes: DGP
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1 and DGP 2. They represents Markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game, which differ in the
conditional choice probabilities σ(a|s). In DGP 1, the matrix of conditional choice probabilities is
0.19 0.30 0.12 0.18
0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07
0.53 0.48 0.46 0.53
0.20 0.13 0.34 0.22
 ,
where the columns index the value of the state s ∈ S = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and the rows index the value
of the action a ∈ A = {1, 2, 3, 4}. In DGP 2, the corresponding matrix of conditional choice
probabilities is 
0.18 0.48 0.03 0.16
0.20 0.21 0.14 0.23
0.29 0.22 0.13 0.26
0.33 0.09 0.70 0.35
 .
Each market is sampled independently. Market i = 1, . . . , n behaves according to DGP 1 if i/n ≤ λ
and to DGP 2 if i/n > λ. Therefore, λ ∈ [0, 1] represents the proportion of markets that are in
DGP 1. Each market is initialized with state equal to 1, and we simulate the corresponding action
according to the corresponding conditional choice probabilities. This, in turn, determines the next
period’s state according to (17). We then proceed iteratively until we have simulated T + 100
periods for each market. Then, the first 100 periods are discarded, producing a sample of T periods
for n markets, which is the data observed by the researcher.
For each simulated data, we implement our proposed test in (3) with K = 10, 000. We consider
simulations with n ∈ {20, 40, 80, 160}, T ∈ {5, 10, 20, 40, 80}, and λ ∈ {1, 0, 0.5, 0.9}. As explained
earlier, λ represents the proportion of markets that are in DGP 1. If λ = 1 or λ = 0, all markets are
sampled from the same distribution, and so the conditional choice probabilities are homogeneous
across markets. This means that H0 in (19) holds. In turn, if λ = 0.5 or λ = 0.9, each data is
composed of markets from both distributions, and so the conditional choice probabilities are not
homogeneous across markets. This means that H0 in (19) fails to hold. Note that λ = 0.5 generates
data in which both distributions are equally represented, and so the heterogeneity in the conditional
choice probabilities should be more salient. On the other hand, the case with λ = 0.9 produces
data with a vast majority of markets in DGP 1, and so the heterogeneity in the conditional choice
probabilities should be harder to detect. For each simulation design, we compute rejection rates
based on 1, 000 independently simulated datasets.
The results from the Monte Carlo simulation are shown in Table 1 for λ ∈ {0, 1} and Table 2
for λ ∈ {0.5, 0.9}, respectively. For the sake of comparison, we also include the results from the test
proposed by Otsu et al. (2016). Their test compares the same test statistics in (20) with critical
values based on the bootstrap. As mentioned earlier, they show the validity of their test in an
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asymptotic framework with T → ∞ and n fixed. In contrast, our main result in Theorem 3.1 is
valid for any finite n and T .
Table 1 reveals that our test achieves relatively good size control for all values of time periods
and market sizes under consideration. The table shows the result of running 80 hypothesis tests
for different data configurations that satisfy H0 in (19) (four market sizes, five time periods, two
test statistics, and two distributions). Across these 80 numbers, our proposed test has an average
rejection rate of 5.3, with a standard deviation of 0.7, and a range of 3.9 to 8. We note that
Theorem 3.1 implies that our test should not produce over-rejection as K becomes large, but it is
silent about the possibility of under-rejection. Table 1 reveals that our test does not seem to suffer
from under-rejection in these simulations. For Otsu et al. (2016)’s test, the average rejection rate
is 5.1, with a standard deviation is 2.2, and a range of 0.6 to 13.5. We note that these extreme
rejection rates occur in simulations with T = 5, which is reasonable for a test whose validity is
proven in an asymptotic framework in which T diverges.
Table 2 explores the performance of these tests for data configurations that do not satisfy H0
in (19) due to the multiplicity of equilibria. We begin by explaining the results of the table that
are common to both hypothesis tests. First, the value of λ denotes the proportion of the n markets
in the data that are in DGP 1. As λ becomes closer to either zero or one, the data are increasingly
coming from a single distribution, making the departure from the H0 harder to detect. Second,
as the number of markets n grows, the inference methods gain more evidence of the presence of
multiplicity, resulting in higher rejection rates. The same phenomenon occurs as the number of
time periods T increases. Third, τ2(X) is designed to be a more efficient test statistic than τ1(X),
which explains why it produces higher rejection rates across the various simulation designs. We
now turn to compare rejection rates between the two tests. In most simulation designs, our test
appears to have a higher or equal rejection rate than Otsu et al. (2016)’s test. The few exceptions
occur in designs with n = 20 and T ∈ {5, 10}, which include cases where their test over-rejects
under the null hypothesis.
6 Empirical application
In this section, we revisit the application in Ryan (2012), as studied in Otsu et al. (2016, Section 5).
Ryan (2012) considers a dynamic discrete game to study the welfare costs of the 1990 Amendments
to the Clean Air Act on the U.S. Portland cement industry. He develops a dynamic oligopoly game
based on Ericson and Pakes (1995), and estimates it using the two-stage method developed by
Bajari et al. (2007). This method’s first stage is to estimate optimal entry, exit, and investment
decisions as a function of production capacity, and it relies on the assumptions that markets are
homogeneous. Our hypothesis test can be used to investigate the validity of this assumption.
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n T
DGP 1 (λ = 1) DGP 2 (λ = 0)
Our test OPT’s test Our test OPT’s test
τ1(X) τ2(X) τ1(X) τ2(X) τ1(X) τ2(X) τ1(X) τ2(X)
20 5 5.6 5.2 13.2 5.9 4.8 4.6 13.5 12.7
20 10 5.5 4.9 7.0 4.5 6.4 5.4 7.9 8.4
20 20 4.1 4.9 4.4 5.0 4.9 5.2 5.8 7.1
20 40 6.0 5.9 5.1 6.2 5.4 4.9 4.8 5.4
20 80 5.6 5.0 5.7 6.6 5.7 5.5 5.1 5.2
40 5 5.5 4.8 6.5 2.3 3.9 4.3 8.0 6.4
40 10 5.5 4.9 3.8 2.7 5.8 6.2 5.2 4.9
40 20 4.6 4.3 4.3 3.4 4.8 5.0 6.2 6.9
40 40 5.7 5.8 4.5 5.3 6.2 4.9 3.9 5.3
40 80 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.3 4.7 4.9 5.6 4.5
80 5 6.1 6.0 5.3 1.5 4.6 4.5 4.6 3.7
80 10 5.4 4.6 3.2 1.2 5.5 5.4 5.6 5.1
80 20 4.9 4.3 5.2 3.5 5.8 4.8 4.9 5.7
80 40 6.5 6.1 3.9 3.9 4.7 4.6 4.7 5.1
80 80 5.2 5.6 4.7 4.6 6.0 6.3 5.3 5.0
160 5 7.0 8.0 4.9 0.6 6.1 6.3 4.0 1.4
160 10 5.5 5.2 3.4 0.9 4.3 5.2 4.7 3.9
160 20 5.2 5.0 3.3 2.4 5.9 5.8 4.5 4.5
160 40 4.7 5.4 4.8 4.8 6.0 5.6 6.3 5.5
160 80 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.6 5.6 6.0 5.5 5.2
Table 1: Simulation results under H0 for α = 5% based on 1,000 i.i.d. simulation draws. The results for
λ = 1 corresponds to data sampled from DGP 1 and λ = 0 corresponds to data sampled from DGP 2. The
test statistics τ1(X) and τ2(X) are defined in (20). Our test is computed according to (3) with K = 10, 000.
OPT refers to Otsu et al. (2016), whose results were copied from Tables 1 and 2 in their paper.
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n T
Mixture with λ = 0.5 Mixture with λ = 0.9
Our test OPT’s test Our test OPT’s test
τ1(X) τ2(X) τ1(X) τ2(X) τ1(X) τ2(X) τ1(X) τ2(X)
20 5 4.5 5.9 10.3 8.3 4.1 5.0 10.7 6.0
20 10 8.6 13.5 6.5 7.4 5.4 5.8 6.5 4.8
20 20 38.2 51.3 27.8 27.4 12.0 15.0 11.7 12.8
20 40 96.3 98.2 79.7 76.1 38.5 40.1 32.7 35.3
20 80 100 100 99.9 99.8 85.9 86.9 75.8 76.5
40 5 4.8 8.1 4.7 4.1 5.1 5.5 4.5 2.5
40 10 9.9 17.8 7.4 5.5 6.3 6.4 5.4 4.2
40 20 63.3 76.3 44.6 36.2 20.2 24.0 16.0 14.8
40 40 100 100 97.4 94.3 59.6 63.7 49.0 50.1
40 80 100 100 100 100 98.5 99.1 93.5 92.5
80 5 4.3 9.3 3.3 2.3 4.8 6.8 3.4 1.7
80 10 13.3 25.2 10.8 5.8 6.3 9.0 5.9 3.2
80 20 87.3 95.4 68.5 55.5 28.5 34.0 23.3 19.7
80 40 100 100 100 99.9 85.1 88.2 72.8 73.2
80 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.7 99.6
160 5 4.1 11.5 2.9 0.9 4.9 7.7 4.0 0.9
160 10 21.4 44.5 12.4 5.8 9.1 12.6 6.0 2.1
160 20 99.2 100 92.3 78.6 44.4 53.0 38.2 30.6
160 40 100 100 100 100 97.7 98.3 93.4 92.4
160 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 2: Simulation results under H1 for α = 5% based on 1,000 i.i.d. simulation draws. The results for
λ = 0.5 corresponds to data sampled from DGP 1 and DGP 2 in equal proportions, and the results for λ = 0.9
corresponds to data sampled from DGP 1 and DGP 2 with proportions 0.9 and 0.1, respectively. The test
statistics τ1(X) and τ2(X) are defined in (20). Our test is computed according to (3) with K = 10, 000.
OPT refers to Otsu et al. (2016), whose results were copied from Tables 3 and 4 in their paper.
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Sample Average Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
1980-1990 4,226.8 2,284.4 1,321.3 12,578.0
1991-1998 3,857.2 2,107.9 1,084.0 9,564.8
Table 3: Summary statistics for market capacity per year, measured in thousand of tons.
Figure 1: Histogram of market capacity per year, measured in thousand of tons.
We use the same data as in Otsu et al. (2016, Section 5). For each year in 1980-1998 and 23
geographically separated U.S. markets, we observe the sum of the production capacities for all the
firms in that market. Table 1 provides summary statistics of this aggregate production capacity
before and after the 1990 Amendments, and Figure 3 provides the corresponding histogram.
These data represent the result of the firms’ optimal entry, exit, and investment decisions in
the dynamic game estimated by Ryan (2012). We follow Otsu et al. (2016) and discretize the
production capacity into 50 bins with equal intervals of 250 thousand tons each (0-250 thousand
tons, 250-500 thousand tons, and so on). For each i = 1, . . . , n = 23 and year t = 1, . . . , 19, we use
Ai,t ∈ A = {1, . . . , 50} to denote the production capacity bin. The state variable in any market is
the previous period’s action, i.e.,
Si,t = Ai,t−1, (21)
and so Si,t ∈ S = {1, . . . , 50}. We note that (21) implies that the state transition probabilities
are homogeneous, and so H0 in (1) is equivalent to the homogeneity of the conditional choice
probabilities.
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Before 1990 After 1990
τ1(X) τ2(X) τ1(X) τ2(X)
Test statistic 199.48 159.43 89.44 90.58
Our p-value 0.17 0.07 0.62 0.56
OPT’s p-value 0.009 0.01 0.09 0.055
Table 4: Results of testing (1) separately before and after the passing of the 1990 Amendments. The test
statistics τ1(X) and τ2(X) are defined in (20). Our test is computed according to (3) with K = 10, 000.
OPT refers to Otsu et al. (2016), whose results were copied from Table 6 in their paper.
Following Ryan (2012) and Otsu et al. (2016), we allow the 1990 Amendments to affect the
decision of the firms. We then test the homogeneity of the conditional choice probabilities for two
subsets of data: before and after 1990. That is, we implement the following hypothesis tests:
Hbefore0 : σi,t(a|s) = σ(a|s) for i = 1, . . . , 23, t = 1, . . . , 10 vs. Hbefore1 : Hbefore0 is false (22)
Hafter0 : σi,t(a|s) = σ(a|s) for i = 1, . . . , 23, t = 11, . . . , 19 vs. Hafter1 : Hafter0 is false (23)
We note that the two samples used to test the hypotheses in (22) and (23) have a relatively
small number of time periods (T = 10 and T = 9 for (22) and (23), respectively) and markets (in
both cases, n = 23). In this sense, this represents an ideal scenario for our proposed test, as its
validity does not rely on either one of these dimensions diverging.
Table 4 shows the results of applying our procedure to test the hypotheses in (22) and (23).
We consider both test statistics in (20), and we use K = 10, 000. At a significance level of α = 5%,
we do not reject the homogeneity of the conditional choice probabilities. Table 4 also shows the
results of the bootstrap-based tests proposed by Otsu et al. (2016), using the same test statistics.
As opposed to our results, their methods reject the hypothesis of homogeneity of the conditional
choice probabilities in the sample prior to 1990.
7 Conclusions
This paper proposes a hypothesis test for the “homogeneity assumption” in dynamic discrete games.
Our test is implemented by an MCMC algorithm. We show that our test is valid as the (user-
defined) number of MCMC draws diverges, regardless of the number of markets and time periods
in the data. This result contrasts with that of available methods in the literature, which require the
number of time periods to diverge. We establish our validity result by showing that our proposed
test is an MCMC approximation to a computationally infeasible randomization test, which happens
to be finite-sample valid. Our Monte Carlo simulations confirm that our test has an excellent
performance in finite samples, both in terms of size control and power.
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A Appendix to Section 3
A.1 Implementation of Step 2 in Algorithm 3.1
For any k = 2, . . . ,K, S(k−1) ∈ SnT , and I(k) selected in Step 1 of Algorithm 3.1, Step 2 of Algorithm
3.1 draws S(k) uniformly within RS(I
(k), S(k−1)). To implement this step, we propose a modification of the
Euler Algorithm. For a description of the Euler Algorithm, see Kandel et al. (1996) and Besag and Mondal
(2013). We first describe the original Euler Algorithm in Algorithm A.1 and then introduce our modification
in Algorithm A.2. Throughout this section, we use 0 to represent an auxiliary value for the state variable
that does not belong to the observed values of the state variable, as 0 6∈ S = {1, 2, . . . , |S|}.
Algorithm A.1 (Euler Algorithm). Given any integer V ≥ 2 and any ξ˘ ∈ (S ∪ {0})V , ξ˜ = (ξ˜1, . . . , ξ˜V ) is
randomly generated as follows:
Step 1: For every s, s′ ∈ S ∪ {0}, define
N (0)(s, s′) = 1{(ξ˘V , ξ˘1) = (s, s′)}+
V∑
v=1
1{(ξ˘v, ξ˘v+1) = (s, s′)}.
Step 2: Define ζ1 = ξ˘V . Set v = 1 and do the following.
(a) Generate ζv+1 according to the following distribution.
P (ζv+1 = s | ζv = s′) = N
(0)(s, s′)∑
s′′∈S∪{0}N (0)(s′′, s′)
,
(b) If (S ∪ {0}) 6⊂ {ζ1, . . . , ζv+1}, then increase v by one and go back to (a). If (S ∪ {0}) ⊂
{ζ1, . . . , ζv+1}, then set v¯ = v + 1 and go to Step 3.
Step 3: Define ξ˜1 = ξ˘1. Also, for every s, s
′ ∈ S ∪ {0}, set
N (1)(s, s′) =
V∑
v=1
1{(ξ˘v, ξ˘v+1) = (s, s′)} − 1{s′ = ζ(min{v=1,...,v¯:ζv=s}−1)}.
Step 4: For every v = 2, . . . , V , generate ξ˜v iteratively according to
P (ξ˜v = s
′ | ξ˜v−1 = s) =

N (v−1)(s, s′)∑
s′′∈S∪{0}N (v−1)(s, s′′)
if
∑
s′′∈S∪{0}N
(v−1)(s, s′′) ≥ 1,
1{s′ = ζ(min{v=1,...,v¯:ζv=s}−1)} otherwise,
where, for every s, s′ ∈ S ∪ {0}, N (v)(s, s′) = N (v−1)(s, s′)− 1{(ξ˜v−1, ξ˜v) = (s, s′)}. 
Before we describe the central property of the Euler algorithm, we first introduce the following definition.
Definition A.1. For any ξ˘ ∈ (S ∪ {0})V , let RS0(ξ˘) denote the set of all ξ˜ ∈ (S ∪ {0})V that satisfy the
following conditions:
(a) ξ˜1 = ξ˘1,
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(b)
∑V
v=1 1{ξ˜v = s, ξ˜v+1 = s′} =
∑V
v=1 1{ξ˘v = s, ξ˘v+1 = s′} for all s, s′ ∈ S ∪ {0}.
Note that ξ˘ ∈ RS0(ξ˘), and so RS0(ξ˘) 6= ∅. Next, we give the main property of the Euler algorithm.
Lemma A.1. For any ξ˘ ∈ (S ∪ {0})V , the outcome of the Euler algorithm given ξ˘ (i.e., Algorithm A.1) is
uniformly distributed over RS0(ξ˘) conditional on ξ˘.
Proof. See Kandel et al. (1996, Theorem 2).
We now introduce our modification of the Euler algorithm to construct S(k) for any k = 2, . . . ,K.
Algorithm A.2 (Generation of S(k)). For any k = 2, . . . ,K and given (X(1), . . . , X(k−1), I(k)), S(k) is
randomly generated as follows:
Case 1: I
(k)
1 6= I(k)2 .
Step 1: Set ξ(k−1) = (S(k−1)
I
(k)
1 ,1
, . . . , S
(k−1)
I
(k)
1 ,T
, 0, S
(k−1)
I
(k)
2 ,1
, . . . , S
(k−1)
I
(k)
2 ,T
, 0).
Step 2: Generate ξ(k) as follows:
(a) Generate a random draw of ξ using the Euler algorithm given ξ(k−1).
(b) If ξT+1 = 0, set ξ
(k) = ξ and go to Step 3. Otherwise, return to (a).
Step 3: Given ξ(k), generate S(k) as follows:
(a) For every i /∈ I(k), generate (S(k)i,1 , . . . , S(k)i,T ) using the Euler algorithm given (S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T ).
(b) (S
(k)
I
(k)
1 ,1
, . . . , S
(k)
I
(k)
1 ,T
) = (ξ
(k)
1 , . . . , ξ
(k)
T ).
(c) (S
(k)
I
(k)
2 ,1
, . . . , S
(k)
I
(k)
2 ,T
) = (ξ
(k)
T+1, . . . , ξ
(k)
2T+1).
Case 2: I
(k)
1 = I
(k)
2 . For every i = 1, . . . , n, generate (S
(k)
i,1 , . . . , S
(k)
i,T ) using the Euler algorithm given
(S
(k−1)
i,1 , . . . , S
(k−1)
i,T ). 
Lemma A.2 shows that S(k) generated by Algorithm A.2 has the desired properties.
Lemma A.2. For any k = 2, . . . ,K, S(k) generated by Algorithm A.2 satisfies the requirements of Step 2
of Algorithm 3.1, i.e., (7) holds.
Proof. We fix k = 2, . . . ,K, (X(1), . . . , X(k−1)), and a generic S˘ ∈ SnT arbitrarily throughout this proof.
We divide the proof in two cases.
Case 1: I
(k)
1 6= I(k)2 . For S(k−1) and S(k) determined by X(k−1) = (S(k−1), A(k−1)) and X(k) =
(S(k), A(k)), and for a generic S˘ ∈ SnT , we set
ξ(k−1) = (S
I
(k−1)
1 ,1
, . . . , S
I
(k−1)
1 ,T
, 0, S
I
(k−1)
2 ,1
, . . . , S
I
(k−1)
2 ,T
, 0),
ξ(k) = (S
I
(k)
1 ,1
, . . . , S
I
(k)
1 ,T
, 0, S
I
(k)
2 ,1
, . . . , S
I
(k)
2 ,T
, 0),
ξ˘ = (S˘
I
(k)
1 ,1
, . . . , S˘
I
(k)
1 ,T
, 0, S˘
I
(k)
2 ,1
, . . . , S˘
I
(k)
2 ,T
, 0).
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Step 3 of Algorithm A.2 implies
P (S(k) = S˘ | I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1)) ={
P (ξ(k) = ξ˘ | ξ(k−1))×∏
i∈(I(k))c P ((S
(k)
i,1 , . . . , S
(k)
i,T ) = (S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) | S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )
}
, (A-1)
Lemma A.1 implies that
P ((S
(k)
i,1 , . . . , S
(k)
i,T ) = (S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) | S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T ) =
1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}
|RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )|
(A-2)
for every i ∈ (I(k))c. In turn, Lemma A.3 implies that
P (ξ(k) = ξ˘ | ξ(k−1)) = 1{ξ˘ ∈ RS0(ξ
(k−1)) : ξ˘T+1 = 0}
|{ξ˜ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξ˜T+1 = 0}|
. (A-3)
By combining (A-1), (A-2), and (A-3),
P (S(k) = S˘ | I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1)) =
1{ξ˘ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξ˘T+1 = 0} ×
∏
i∈(I(k))c 1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}
|{ξ˜ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξ˜T+1 = 0}| ×
∏
i∈(I(k))c |RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )|
. (A-4)
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the right-hand side of (A-4) is equal to the right-hand side of
(7). To this end, it suffices to show that
1{ξ˘ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξ˘T+1 = 0} ×
∏
i∈(I(k))c
1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}
= 1{S˘ ∈ RS(I(k), S(k−1))} (A-5)
and
|{ξ˜ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξ˜T+1 = 0}| ×
∏
i∈(I(k))c
|RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )| = |RS(I(k), S(k−1))|. (A-6)
To show (A-5), consider the following derivation.
1{ξ˘ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξ˘T+1 = 0} ×
∏
i∈(I(k))c
1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}
=
{
1{(S˘
I
(k)
1 ,1
, . . . , S˘
I
(k)
1 ,T
, 0, S˘
I
(k)
2 ,1
, . . . , S˘
I
(k)
2 ,T
, 0) ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1))}
×∏i∈(I(k))c 1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}
}
(1)
= 1

S˘i,1 = S
(k−1)
i,1 for all i = 1, . . . , n,∑
i∈I(k)
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s′} =
∑
i∈I(k)
∑T−1
t=1 1{S(k−1)i,t = s, S(k−1)i,t+1 = s′} ∀s, s′ ∈ S,∑
i∈I(k) 1{S˘i,T = s} =
∑
i∈I(k) 1{S(k−1)i,T = s} for all s ∈ S,∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s′} =
∑T−1
t=1 1{S(k−1)i,t = s, S(k−1)i,t+1 = s′} for all s, s′ ∈ S, i ∈ (I(k))c

(2)
= 1

S˘i,1 = S
(k−1)
i,1 for all i = 1, . . . , n,∑
i∈I(k)
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s′} =
∑
i∈I(k)
∑T−1
t=1 1{S(k−1)i,t = s, S(k−1)i,t+1 = s′} ∀s, s′ ∈ S,∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s′} =
∑T−1
t=1 1{S(k−1)i,t = s, S(k−1)i,t+1 = s′} for all s, s′ ∈ S, i ∈ (I(k))c

(3)
= 1{S˘ ∈ RS(I(k), S(k−1))},
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as desired, where (1) follows from I
(k)
1 6= I(k)2 and applying Definition A.1, (2) follows from Lemma A.4, and
(3) follows from Definition 3.1. To show (A-6), consider the following argument.
1 =
∑
S˘∈S
P (S(k) = S˘ | I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1))
(1)
=
∑
S˘∈S 1{S˘ ∈ RS(I(k), S(k−1))}
|{ξ˜ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξ˜T+1 = 0}| ×
∏
i∈(I(k))c |RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )|
=
|RS(I(k), S(k−1))|
|{ξ˜ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξ˜T+1 = 0}| ×
∏
i∈(I(k))c |RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )|
,
where (1) follows from combining (A-4) and (A-5). From here, (A-6) follows.
Case 2: I
(k)
1 = I
(k)
2 . Algorithm A.2 implies
P (S(k) = S˘ | I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1)) =
n∏
i=1
P ((S
(k)
i,1 , . . . , S
(k)
i,T ) = (S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) | S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T ). (A-7)
Lemma A.1 implies that for every i = 1, . . . , n,
P ((S
(k)
i,1 , . . . , S
(k)
i,T ) = (S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) | S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T ) =
1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}
|RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )|
.
(A-8)
By combining (A-7) and (A-8)
P (S(k) = S˘ | I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1)) =
n∏
i=1
1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}
|RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )|
=
∏n
i=1 1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}∏n
i=1 |RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )|
. (A-9)
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the right-hand side of (A-9) is equal to the right-hand side of
(7). To this end, it suffices to show that
n∏
i=1
1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )} = 1{S˘ ∈ RS(I(k), S(k−1))} (A-10)
n∏
i=1
|RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )| = |RS(I(k), S(k−1))|. (A-11)
To show (A-10), consider the following derivation.
n∏
i=1
1{(S˘i,1, . . . , S˘i,T ) ∈ RS0(S(k−1)i,1 , . . . , S(k−1)i,T )}
(1)
= 1
{
S˘i,1 = S
(k−1)
i,1 for all i = 1, . . . , n,∑T
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s′} =
∑T
t=1 1{S(k−1)i,t = s, S(k−1)i,t+1 = s′} for all s, s′ ∈ S and i = 1, . . . , n
}
(2)
= 1{S˘ ∈ RS(I(k), S(k−1))},
as desired, where (1) follows from I
(k)
1 = I
(k)
2 and applying Definition A.1 for each i = 1, . . . , n, and (2)
follows from Definition 3.1. Finally, (A-11) can be shown by using an argument that is analogous to the one
used to prove (A-6). We omit this for the sake of brevity.
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Lemma A.3. For any k = 2, . . . ,K, if ξ(k) is generated by Algorithm A.2, then ξ(k) is uniformly distributed
over the set {ξ ∈ RS0(ξ(k−1)) : ξT+1 = 0)} conditional on (I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1)).
Proof. By Lemma A.1, ξ˜ in Step 2(a) of Algorithm A.2 follows the uniform distribution on RS0(ξ
(k−1)),
conditional on (I(k), X(1), . . . , X(k−1)). Steps 2(b) of Algorithm A.2 truncates the variable to the set {ξ ∈
RS0(ξ
(k−1)) : ξT+1 = 0}. The desired result then follows from the fact that a truncated version of a discrete
uniform distribution is uniformly distributed on the truncated set.
Lemma A.4. For any I ∈ I, if S˘, S˜ ∈ SnT satisfy the following conditions:
(a) S˜i,1 = S˘i,1 for all i ∈ I,
(b)
∑
i∈I
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˜i,t = s, S˜i,t+1 = s′} =
∑
i∈I
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s′} for all s, s′ ∈ S,
then,
∑
i∈I 1{S˜i,T = s} =
∑
i∈I 1{S˘i,T = s} for all s ∈ S.
Proof. For every i ∈ I and s ∈ S, note that
1{S˘i,T = s} =
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˘i,t+1 = s} −
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˘i,t = s}+ 1{S˘i,1 = s}
=
∑
s¯∈S
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˘i,t = s¯, S˘i,t+1 = s} −
∑
s¯∈S
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s¯}+ 1{S˘i,1 = s}. (A-12)
By the same argument applied to S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), we have that for every i ∈ I and s ∈ S,
1{S˜i,T = s} =
∑
s¯∈S
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˜i,t = s¯, S˜i,t+1 = s} −
∑
s¯∈S
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˜i,t = s, S˜i,t+1 = s¯′}+ 1{S˜i,1 = s}. (A-13)
To show this lemma, fix s ∈ S arbitrarily and consider the following argument.
∑
i∈I
1{S˘i,T = s} (1)=
∑
s¯∈S
∑
i∈I
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˘i,t = s¯, S˘i,t+1 = s} −
∑
s¯∈S
∑
i∈I
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˘i,t = s, S˘i,t+1 = s¯}+
∑
i∈I
1{S˘i,1 = s}
(2)
=
∑
s¯∈S
∑
i∈I
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˜i,t = s¯, S˜i,t+1 = s} −
∑
s¯∈S
∑
i∈I
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˜i,t = s, S˜i,t+1 = s¯}+
∑
i∈I
1{S˜i,1 = s}
(3)
=
∑
i∈I
1{S˜i,T = s},
where (1) holds by (A-12), (2) holds by conditions (a)-(b), and (3) holds by (A-13).
A.2 Implementation of Step 3 in Algorithm 3.1
For any k = 2, . . . ,K, X(k−1) ∈ X , and S(k) ∈ SnT , Step 3 of Algorithm 3.1 draws A(k) uniformly within
RA(S
(k), X(k−1)). This can be implemented by the following algorithm.
Algorithm A.3 (Generation of A(k)). For any k = 2, . . . ,K and given (X(1), . . . , X(k−1), Ik, S(k)), A(k) is
randomly generated as follows
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Step 1: For every (s, s′) ∈ S × S, define
Index(k−1)(s, s′) = {(i, t) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T − 1} : (S(k−1)i,t , S(k−1)i,t+1 ) = (s, s′)}
Index(k)(s, s′) = {(i, t) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T − 1} : (S(k)i,t , S(k)i,t+1) = (s, s′)}
Index(k−1)(s) = {(i, T ) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, S(k−1)i,T = s}
Index(k)(s) = {(i, T ) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, S(k)i,T = s}.
Step 2: For every (s, s′) ∈ S × S, we generate (A(k)i,t : (i, t) ∈ Index(k)(s, s′)) by uniformly sampling from
(A
(k−1)
i,t : (i, t) ∈ Index(k−1)(s, s′)) without replacement, i.e., a uniformly chosen permutation.
Step 3: For every s ∈ S, we construct (A(k)i,T : (i, T ) ∈ Index(k)(s)) by uniformly sampling from the discrete
set (A
(k−1)
i,T : (i, T ) ∈ Index(k−1)(s)) without replacement, i.e., a uniformly chosen permutation. 
Lemma A.5 shows that A(k) generated by Algorithm A.3 has the desired properties.
Lemma A.5. For any k = 2, . . . ,K, the outcome, A(k), of Algorithm A.3 satisfies the requirements of Step
3 of Algorithm 3.1, i.e., (8) holds.
Proof. This follows from noting that any element of RA(S
(k), X(k−1)) corresponds to a restricted set of
permutations of the action data, and Algorithm A.3 chooses an element uniformly within this set.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1
By (3), (5) is equivalent to lim infK→∞(α− P (pˆK ≤ α)) ≥ 0. In this proof, we are going to show a stronger
statement (cf. Lehmann and Romano, 2005, Eq. (15.6)):
lim inf
K→∞
inf
u∈[0,1]
(u− P (pˆK ≤ u)) ≥ 0.
Fix ε > 0 and u ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily. The rest of the proof is going to show
u− P (pˆK ≤ u) ≥ −2ε
for sufficiently large K. For any positive integer K, let
EK ≡
supt∈R
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1K
K∑
k=1
1{τ(X(k)) ≥ t} − 1|G|
∑
g∈G
1{τ(g(X)) ≥ t}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > ε
 .
By Lemma 4.4, for sufficiently large K,
P (EK) ≤ ε. (A-14)
For any positive integer K, consider the following derivation:
P (pˆK ≤ u) = P
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
1{τ(X(k)) ≥ τ(X)} ≤ u
)
= P
({
1
K
K∑
k=1
1{τ(X(k)) ≥ τ(X)} ≤ u
}
∪ EcK
)
+ P
({
1
K
K∑
k=1
1{τ(X(k)) ≥ τ(X)} ≤ u
}
∪ EK
)
≤ P
 1
|G|
∑
g∈G
1{τ(g(X)) ≥ τ(X)} ≤ u+ ε
+ P (EK)
(1)
≤ u+ ε+ P (EK), (A-15)
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where (1) holds by Lemma 4.3. By (A-15) and (A-14), we conclude that, for sufficiently large K, P (pˆK ≤
u) ≤ u+ 2ε or, equivalently, u− P (pˆK ≤ u) ≥ −2ε, as desired. 
B Appendix to Section 4
B.1 Proof of lemmas
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Note that
P (S = S˜) =
n∏
i=1
(
mi(S˜i,1)
T−1∏
t=1
(∑
a∈A
g(S˜i,t+1|a, S˜i,t)σ(a|S˜i,t)
))
. (B-16)
This equation follows from the following derivation
P (S = S˜)
(1)
=
n∏
i=1
(
P (Si,1 = S˜i,1)
T−1∏
t=1
P (Si,t = S˜i,t|(Si,1, . . . , Si,t−1) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t−1))
)
(2)
=
n∏
i=1
(
P (Si,1 = S˜i,1)
T−1∏
t=1
P (Si,t = S˜i,t|Si,t−1 = S˜i,t−1)
)
=
n∏
i=1
(
P (Si,1 = S˜i,1)
T−1∏
t=1
(∑
a∈A
(
P (Si,t = S˜i,t|Ai,t−1 = a, Si,t−1 = S˜i,t−1)
×P (Ai,t−1 = a|Si,t−1 = S˜i,t−1)
)))
(3)
=
n∏
i=1
(
mi(S˜i,1)
T−1∏
t=1
(∑
a∈A
g(S˜i,t+1|a, S˜i,t)σ(a|S˜i,t)
))
,
where (1) holds by Assumption 2.1(a), (2) holds by Lemma B.2, and (3) holds holds under H0 in (1).
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show (11) and (12). To this end, consider the following derivation.
P (X = X˜)
(1)
=
n∏
i=1
(
mi(S˜i,1)σ(A˜i,T |S˜i,T )
T−1∏
t=1
(
σ(A˜i,t|S˜i,t)g(S˜i,t+1|S˜i,t, A˜i,t)
))
(2)
= P (S = S˜)
(
σ(A˜i,T |S˜i,T )
(
T−1∏
t=1
σ(A˜i,t|S˜i,t)g(S˜i,t+1|S˜i,t, A˜i,t)∑
a∈A g(S˜i,t+1|a, S˜i,t)σ(a|S˜i,t)
))
, (B-17)
where (1) holds by (2), which is shown in Lemma B.1, and (2) holds by (B-16). By combining (10) and
(B-17), we conclude that
P (A = A˜|S = S˜) =
n∏
i=1
(
σ(A˜i,T |S˜i,T )
(
T−1∏
t=1
σ(A˜i,t|S˜i,t)g(S˜i,t+1|S˜i,t, A˜i,t)∑
a∈A g(S˜i,t+1|a, S˜i,t)σ(a|S˜i,t)
))
.
By re-expressing this equation in terms of counts of (s, a, s′) ∈ S × A × S, (11) follows. Moreover, (12)
follows from re-expressing (B-16) in terms of individual counts of each (s, s′) ∈ S × S.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. We first show that G is a collection of transformations from X onto itself. Consider
any g ∈ G. By definition, g is the composition of a finite number of transformations in ⋃I∈IG(I), i.e.,
g = g(K) ◦ · · · ◦ g(1) with (g(1), . . . , g(K)) ∈ G(I(1)) × · · · × G(I(K)) with I(j) ∈ I for j = 1, . . . ,K. By
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Lemma B.3, g(j) ∈ G(I(j)) are onto transformations from X to itself. From this, we can conclude that
g = g(K) ◦ · · · ◦ g(1) is an onto transformation from X to itself, as desired.
Second, we show that G is a group. To this end, it suffices to verify conditions (i)-(iv) in Lehmann and
Romano (2005, Section A.1). To verify condition (i), consider arbitrary g1, g2 ∈ G. By definition, this implies
g1 and g2 are compositions of a finite number of transformations in
⋃
I∈IG(I). Then, g2◦g1 is a composition
of a finite number of elements in
⋃
I∈IG(I), and so g2 ◦ g1 ∈ G. Condition (ii) follows from the argument in
Lehmann and Romano (2005, page 693). Condition (iii) follows from the fact that G(I) is a group for any
for any I ∈ I (shown in Lemma B.3), and so it includes the identity transformation. To verify condition (iv),
consider the following argument for any arbitrary g ∈ G. By definition, g is the composition of a finite number
of transformations in
⋃
I∈IG(I), i.e., g = g
(K) ◦ · · · ◦ g(1) with (g(1), . . . , g(K)) ∈ G(I(1)) × · · · ×G(I(K))
with I(j) ∈ I for j = 1, . . . ,K. By Lemma B.3, G(I(j)) is a group for each j = 1, . . . ,K. From this, we
can conclude that ∃(g(j))−1 ∈ G(I(j)) for each j = 1, . . . ,K. Since g ◦ g˜ and g˜ ◦ g are equal to the identity
transformation, g˜ = g−1. Finally, note that g−1 = (g(1))−1 ◦ · · · ◦ (g(K))−1 is the compositions of a finite
number of transformations in
⋃
I∈IG(I) and so g
−1 ∈ G, as desired.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that, for any X˜ ∈ X and g ∈ G, X˜ and gX˜ have the same
sufficient statistics in (13). g is the composition of a finite number of transformations in
⋃
I∈IG(I), i.e.,
g = g(K) ◦ · · · ◦ g(1) with (g(1), . . . , g(K)) ∈ G(I(1))×· · ·×G(I(K)) with I(j) ∈ I for j = 1, . . . ,K. Therefore,
gX˜ = g(K) ◦ · · · ◦ g(1)X˜. For each j = 1, . . . ,K, Lemma B.4 implies that, for any X˘ ∈ X and g(j) ∈ G(I(j)),
g(j)X˘ and X˘ have the same sufficient statistic in (13). From these observations and by finite induction, it
follows that X˜ and gX˜ have the same sufficient statistics in (13), as desired.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. By Lemma 4.2, we know (i) G is a finite group of transformations of X onto itself, and
(ii) if X satisfies H0 in (19), then X and gX have the same sufficient statistics in (13) for any g ∈ G. The
second statement, together with Lemma 4.1, implies that the randomization hypothesis holds (Lehmann
and Romano 2005, Definition 15.2.1), i.e., if X satisfies H0 in (1), its distribution is invariant under the
transformations in G. Under these conditions, the result follows from Lehmann and Romano (2005, Eq.
(15.6) and Problem 15.2).
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We condition on X ∈ X throughout this proof. Let (G(1), . . . , G(K)) be as in Definition
B.1. By Lemma B.5, it suffices to show that
sup
t∈R
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1K
K∑
k=1
1{τ(G(k)X) ≥ t} − 1|G|
∑
g∈G
1{τ(gX) ≥ t}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ a.s.→ 0 as K →∞. (B-18)
For any k = 1, . . . ,K, Definition B.1 implies that G(k)X ∈ X . Thus, τ(G(k)X) takes values in the finite
set {τ(X˜) : X˜ ∈ X}. It then suffices to show the pointwise version of (B-18), i.e.,
1
K
K∑
k=1
1{τ(G(k)X) ≥ t} a.s.→ 1|G|
∑
g∈G
1{τ(gX) ≥ t} as K →∞.
By Definition B.1, (G(1), . . . , G(K)) is the result of a Markov chain with transition probability given
in (B-22). By Robert and Casella (2004, Algorithm A-24 and pages 270-1), we can equivalently interpret
27
(G(1), . . . , G(K)) as the outcome of a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. For any g, g˘ ∈ G, this Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm has a conditional density q(g˘ | g) ≡ P (G(k+1) = g˘|G(k) = g), a target probability f
defined by
f(g) ≡ 1{g ∈ G}|G| , (B-19)
and Metropolis-Hastings acceptance probability equal to one. To show the latter, note that, for every
g, g˘ ∈ G,
ρ(g, g˘) = min
{
f(g˘)
f(g)
× q(g | g˘)
q(g˘ | g) , 1
}
(1)
= 1,
where (1) uses that f(g˘) = f(g) = 1/|G| and q(g | g˘) = q(g˘ | g) by (B-19) and Lemma B.9, respectively. By
this and Robert and Casella (2004, Theorem 7.4), it suffices to show that the conditional density q(g˘ | g) is
f -irreducible. By Robert and Casella (2004, Theorem 6.15, part (i)), this follows from showing that, for any
g, g˘ ∈ G (and so f(g) > 0 and f(g˘) > 0), the Markov chain has a positive probability of transitioning from
g to g˘ after a sufficient number of steps. We devote the rest of the proof to show this.
Consider any arbitrary choice of g, g˘ ∈ G. Since G is the group generated by finitely many compositions
of elements in
⋃
I∈IG(I), there are (g
(1), . . . , g(K1+K2)) ∈ G(I(1)) × · · · ×G(I(K1+K2)) with I(j) ∈ I for
j = 1, . . . ,K such that g = g(K1) ◦ · · · ◦ g(1) and g˘ = g(K1+K2) ◦ · · · ◦ g(K1+1). By Lemma B.3, G(I(j)) is a
group for all j = 1, . . . ,K1 +K2, and so (g
(j))−1 ∈ G(I(j)) for every j = 1, . . . ,K1 +K2. Then, note that
g˘ = g˘ ◦ g−1 ◦ g
(1)
= g(K1+K2) ◦ · · · ◦ g(K1+1) ◦ (g(1))−1 ◦ · · · ◦ (g(K1))−1 ◦ g
(2)
= g˘(K1+K2) ◦ · · · ◦ g˘(K1+1) ◦ g˘(K1) ◦ · · · ◦ g˘(1) ◦ g, (B-20)
where (1) holds by setting g˘ = g(K1+K2) ◦ · · · ◦ g(K1+1) and g−1 = (g(1))−1 ◦ · · · ◦ (g(K1))−1, and (2) holds by
defining (g˘(1), . . . , g˘(K1+K2)) = ((g(K1))−1, . . . , (g(1))−1, g(K1+1), . . . , g(K1+K2)). Note that (B-20) provides a
specific path for transitioning from g to g˘ after K1 + K2 steps. We complete the proof by showing that
P (G(K1+K2+k) = g˘|G(k) = g) > 0 for any posive integer k. To this end, we define (I˘(1), . . . , I˘(K1+K2)) =
(I(K1), . . . , I(1), I(K1+1), . . . , I(K1+K2)) and we consider the following argument:
P (G(K1+K2+k) = g˘|G(k) = g)
(1)
≥ q(g˘(1) ◦ g|g)
K∏
k=2
q(g˘(k) ◦ · · · ◦ g˘(1) ◦ g | g˘(k−1) ◦ · · · ◦ g˘(1) ◦ g)
(2)
≥
K1+K2∏
j=1
1
|I||G(I˘j)|
(3)
> 0,
where (1) uses the fact that the conditional distribution of G(j+1) given G(j) is q for all j = 1, . . . ,K1 +K2,
(2) holds by (B-22) and g˘(j) ∈ I˘(j) for all j = 1, . . . ,K1 + K2, and (3) holds because I˘(j) ∈ I for all
j = 1, . . . ,K1 +K2.
B.2 Auxiliary results
Lemma B.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 and H0 in (1), (2) holds.
28
Proof. Consider the following derivation.
P (X = X˜)
(1)
=
n∏
i=1
P ((Si,t, Ai,t) = (S˜i,t, A˜i,t) : t = 1, . . . , T )
(2)
=
n∏
i=1
[
P (Si,1 = S˜i,1, Ai,1 = A˜i,1)×∏T
t=2 P ((Si,t, Ai,t) = (S˜i,t, A˜i,t)|(Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) = (S˜i,t−1, A˜i,t−1))
]
(3)
=
n∏
i=1
 P (Si,1 = S˜i,1)(∏Tt=1 P (Ai,t = A˜i,t|Si,t = S˜i,t))
×
(∏T−1
t=1 P (Si,t+1 = S˜i,t+1|Si,t = S˜i,t, Ai,t = A˜i,t)
) 
(4)
=
n∏
i=1
[
mi(S˜i,1)
(
T∏
t=1
σ(A˜i,t|S˜i,t)
)(
T−1∏
t=1
g(S˜i,t+1|S˜i,t, A˜i,t)
)]
,
where (1) holds by Assumption 2.1(a), (2) holds by Assumption 2.1(b), (3) holds by Assumption 2.1(c), and
(4) holds under H0 in (1).
Lemma B.2. Under Assumptions 2.1(b)-(c), the state variable is Markovian, i.e., for every i = 1, . . . , n and
t = 2, . . . T and every S˜ ∈ SnT ,
P (Si,t = S˜i,t|Si,t−1 = S˜i,t−1) = P (Si,t = S˜i,t|(Si,1, . . . , Si,t−1) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t−1)). (B-21)
Proof. Fix i = 1, . . . , n, t = 2, . . . T , and S˜ ∈ SnT arbitrarily. Consider the following argument.
P ((Si,1, . . . , Si,t) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t))
=
∑
(a1,...,at−1)∈At−1
(
P ((Si,1, Ai,1, . . . , Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) = (S˜i,1, a1, . . . , S˜i,t−1, at−1))×
P (Si,t = S˜i,t|(Si,1, Ai,1, . . . , Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) = (S˜i,1, a1, . . . , S˜i,t−1, at−1))
)
(1)
=
∑
(a1,...,at−1)∈At−1
(
P ((Si,1, Ai,1, . . . , Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) = (S˜i,1, a1, . . . , S˜i,t−1, at−1))
×P (Si,t = S˜i,t|(Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) = (S˜i,t−1, at−1))
)
=
∑
at−1∈A
(
P ((Si,1, . . . , Si,t−1) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t−1), Ai,t−1 = at−1)
×P (Si,t = S˜i,t|(Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) = (S˜i,t−1, at−1))
)
=
∑
at−1∈A
 P (Ai,t−1 = at−1|(Si,1, . . . , Si,t−1) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t−1))×P ((Si,1, . . . , Si,t−1) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t−1))
×P (Si,t = S˜i,t|(Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) = (S˜i,t−1, at−1))

(2)
=
∑
at−1∈A
(
P (Ai,t−1 = at−1|Si,t−1 = S˜i,1)P ((Si,1, . . . , Si,t−1) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t−1))
×P (Si,t = S˜i,t|(Si,t−1, Ai,t−1) = (S˜i,t−1, at−1))
)
= P (Si,t = S˜i,t|Si,t−1 = S˜i,t−1)P ((Si,1, . . . , Si,t−1) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t−1))
where (1) holds by Assumption 2.1(b) and (2) holds by Assumption 2.1(c). Therefore,
P (Si,t = S˜i,t|Si,t−1 = S˜i,t−1) = P (Si,t = S˜i,t|(Si,1, . . . , Si,t−1) = (S˜i,1, . . . , S˜i,t−1)),
as desired.
Lemma B.3. For any I ∈ I, G(I) is a group.
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Proof. We fix I ∈ I arbitrarily. It suffices to verify conditions (i)-(iv) in Lehmann and Romano (2005,
Section A.1). Note that we can verify condition (ii) using the same argument as in Lehmann and Romano
(2005, page 693).
We begin with condition (i). First, for any arbitrary g1, g2 ∈ G(I), we now verify that g2 ◦ g1 ∈ G(I).
Since g1, g2 ∈ G(I), g1 and g2 are both onto transformations of X onto itself, then g2 ◦ g1 is an onto
transformation of X onto itself. Now we will show that, for any (S˘, A˘) ∈ X , the data configuration (S˜, A˜) =
(g2◦g1)(S˘, A˘) satisfies S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)). Define (S˙, A˙) = g1(S˘, A˘). Now (S˙, A˙) = g1(S˘, A˘)
and (S˜, A˜) = g2(S˙, A˙). Since g1, g2 ∈ G(I), all the conditions in Definitions 3.1 and 3.2 satisfy the transitive
property as the equality condition, so that S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)), as desired. By combining
these results, we conclude that g2 ◦ g1 ∈ G(I), as desired.
To verify condition (iii), we now show that the identity transformation belongs to G(I). To this end,
we note that the identity transformation is an onto transformation of X onto itself, and S˘ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and
A˘ ∈ RA(S˘, (S˘, A˘)).
To verify condition (iv), we now show that for any g ∈ G(I), g−1 ∈ G(I) holds. By definition G(I)
is a collection of onto transformations that map a finite set X onto itself. By the pigeonhole principle, the
transformations in G(I) are one to one, i.e., bijective, implying that g−1 is well defined. First, note that g−1
is a bijective transformation (hence, an onto transformation) of X onto itself. For the rest of the verification
of Condition (iv), pick X˜ ∈ X arbitrarily. Second, we would like to show that, for any (S˘, A˘) ∈ X , the
data configuration (S˜, A˜) = g−1(S˘, A˘) satisfies S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)). Since g ∈ G(I) and
g(S˜, A˜) = g(g−1(S˘, A˘)) = (S˘, A˘), we have S˘ ∈ RS(I, S˜) and A˘ ∈ RA(S˘, (S˜, A˜)). Note that all the conditions
in Definitions 3.1 and 3.2 treat (S˜, A˜) and (S˘, A˘) symmetrically. Therefore, we have S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and
A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)), as desired.
Lemma B.4. For any I ∈ I and any g ∈ G(I), X˘ and gX˘ have the same sufficient statistic in (13), i.e.,
U(X˘) = U(gX˘).
Proof. Let X˘ = (S˘, A˘) and X˜ = (S˜, A˜) = g(S˘, A˘). By definition 4.1, this implies that S˜ ∈ RS(S˘) and
A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)). By (13), it then suffices to show the following statements:
1. S˘i,1 = S˜i,1 for all i = 1, . . . , n,
2.
∑n
i=1
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˜i,t = s, A˜i,t = a, S˜i,t+1 = s′} =
∑n
i=1
∑T−1
t=1 1{S˘i,t = s, A˘i,t = a, S˘i,t+1 = s′} for all
s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A,
3.
∑n
i=1 1{S˜i,T = s, A˜i,T = a} =
∑n
i=1 1{S˘i,T = s, A˘i,T = a} for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A.
The first statement follows from S˜ ∈ RS(S˘) and condition (a) in Definition 3.1. The second and third
statements follow from A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)) and conditions (a) and (b) in Definition 3.2, respectively.
Several upcoming results involve a Markov chain of transformations in G, specified in Definition B.1.
Definition B.1. Let (G(1), . . . , G(K)) denote a Markov chain of transformations of X onto itself that is
defined as follows:
• G(1) : X → X be equal to the identity transformation, i.e., x = G(1)x for any x ∈ X
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• For any k = 2, . . . ,K and given (G(1), . . . , G(k−1), X), G(k) : X → X is a random transformation
distributed according to the following transition probability:
P (G(k) = g˜ | G(1), . . . , G(k−1), X) = P (G(k) = g˜ | G(k−1)) =
∑
I∈I
∑
g∈G(I)
1{g˜ = g ◦ (G(k−1))}
|I| × |G(I)| . (B-22)
Lemma B.5. Conditional on X, (X(1), . . . , X(K)) generated by Algorithm 3.1 and (G(1)X, . . . , G(K)X)
with (G(1), . . . , G(K)) as in Definition B.1 have the same distribution.
Proof. We condition on X throughout this proof. First, note that Algorithm 3.1 and Definition B.1 imply
that X = X(1) = G(1)X. Second, note that (X(1), . . . , X(K)) and (G(1)X, . . . , G(K)X) are both Markov
chains in X . To complete the proof, it suffices to show that they have the same transition probabilities.
The transition probability of (X(1), . . . , X(K)) is specified in (9). It then suffices to show that, for any
k = 2, . . . ,K, X˜ = (S˜, A˜) ∈ X , and G(k−1)X = X˘ = (S˘, A˘) ∈ X ,
P (G(k)X = X˜ | G(1)X, . . . , G(k−2)X,G(k−1)X = X˘,X)
= P (G(k)X = X˜ | G(k−1)X = X˘,X)
=

∑
I∈I
1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}
|I| × |RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)|
if |RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)| > 0,
0 otherwise.
(B-23)
For the rest of the proof, we fix k = 2, . . . ,K, and X˜ = (S˜, A˜), X˘ = (S˘, A˘) ∈ X arbitrarily. To show
(B-23), consider the following derivation.
P (G(k)X = X˜ | G(1)X, . . . , G(k−2)X,G(k−1)X = X˘,X)
(1)
= E[P (G(k)X = X˜ | G(1), . . . , G(k−1), X) | G(1)X, . . . , G(k−2)X,G(k−1)X = X˘,X]
(2)
= E[P (G(k)X = X˜ | G(k−1), X) | G(1)X, . . . , G(k−2)X,G(k−1)X = X˘,X], (B-24)
where (1) holds by the law of total probability, and (2) holds by (B-22). From (B-24), (B-23) follows if we
show that, for G(k−1)X = X˘,
P (G(k)X = X˜ | G(k−1), X) =

∑
I∈I
1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}
|I| × |RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)|
if |RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)| > 0,
0 otherwise.
(B-25)
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To show (B-25), consider the following derivation.
P (G(k)X = X˜ | G(k−1), X) (1)= P (G(k)(G(k−1))−1X˘ = X˜ | G(k−1), X)
=
∑
g∈G
P (G(k) = g | G(k−1), X)1{g(G(k−1))−1X˘ = X˜}
(2)
=
∑
g∈G
∑
I∈I
1
|I|
∑
g˜∈G(I) 1{g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))−1}
|G(I)| 1{g(G
(k−1))−1X˘ = X˜}
=
1
|I|
∑
I∈I
∑
g˜∈G(I)
∑
g∈G 1{g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))}1{g(G(k−1))−1X˘ = X˜}
|G(I)|
(3)
=
1
|I|
∑
I∈I
∑
g˜∈G(I)
∑
g∈G 1{g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))}1{g˜X˘ = X˜}
|G(I)|
=
1
|I|
∑
I∈I
∑
g˜∈G(I) 1{g˜X˘ = X˜}
∑
g∈G 1{g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))}
|G(I)|
(4)
=
1
|I|
∑
I∈I
∑
g˜∈G(I) 1{g˜X˘ = X˜}
|G(I)| , (B-26)
where (1) holds by G(k−1)X = X˘ and the fact that (G(k−1))−1 ∈ G since G is a group (by Lemma 4.2), (2)
holds by (B-22), (3) holds because {g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))} occurs if and only if {g(G(k−1))−1 = g˜}, and (4) holds
because
∑
g∈G 1{g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))} = 1, as we show in the next paragraph.
To show
∑
g∈G 1{g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))} = 1, consider the following argument. Since g, g˜, G(k−1) ∈ G, and
G is a group, g˜ ◦ (G(k−1)) ∈ G, and so ∃g ∈ G s.t. g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1)), i.e., ∑g∈G 1{g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))} ≥ 1.
Now, suppose that
∑
g∈G 1{g = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1))} > 1. This implies that ∃g1, g2 ∈ G with g1 6= g2 s.t.
g1 = g˜ ◦ (G(k−1)) = g2. But using again that G is a group, ∃g−11 ∈ G and so g−11 g2 = g−11 g1 and
g2g
−1
1 = g1g
−1
1 and both equal to the identity transformation. This would imply that g
−1
1 = g
−1
2 , and since
the inverse transformation is unique, reach a contradiction.
Fix I ∈ I arbitrarily. By (B-26), (B-25) then follows from showing that
∑
g˜∈G(I)
1{g˜X˘ = X˜}
|G(I)| =

1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}
|RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)|
if |RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)| > 0,
0 otherwise.
(B-27)
We divide our argument into two cases. First, consider |RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)| = 0. In this case, we have
6 ∃g ∈ G(I) s.t. gX˘ = X˜, and therefore
∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˜}
|G(I)| = 0,
which verifies (B-27).
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Second, consider |RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)| > 0. Then, consider the following derivation.∑
g∈G(I) 1{gX˘ = X˜}
|G(I)|
(1)
=
∑
g∈G(I) 1{gX˘ = X˜}
|G(I)| 1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}
(2)
=
∑
g∈G(I) 1{gX˘ = X˘}
|G(I)| 1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}
(3)
=
1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}
|RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˘, X˘)|
(4)
=
1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}
|RS(I, S˘)| × |RA(S˜, X˘)|
, (B-28)
which verifies (B-27), where (1) follows from Definition 4.1, as it implies that {g˜X˘ = X˜} with g˜ ∈ G(I),
X˘ = (S˘, A˘), and X˜ = (S˜, A˜) implies that {S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘)} and {A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}, (2) follows from Lemma
B.6, and (3) is shown in (B-29), and (4) follows from Lemma B.7 (which applies because the expression is
multiplied by 1{S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘)}).
To show (3) in (B-28), consider the following argument.
|G(I)| (1)=
∑
X˜∈X
 ∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˜}

(2)
=
∑
S˜∈RS(I,S˘)
∑
A˜∈RA(S˜,X˘)
 ∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˜}

(3)
=
 ∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˘}
 ∑
S˜∈RS(I,S˘)
∑
A˜∈RA(S˜,X˘)
=
 ∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˘}
 ∑
S˜∈RS(I,S˘)
|RA(S˜, X˘)|
(4)
=
 ∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˘}
 |RA(S˘, X˘)| ∑
S˜∈RS(I,S˘)
1
=
 ∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˘}
 |RA(S˘, X˘)| × |RS(I, S˘)|, (B-29)
where (1) follows from partitioning G(I) into its possible range of outcomes when applied to X˘ ∈ X =
SnT × AnT , (2) follows from Definition 4.1, as it implies that {g˜X˘ = X˜} with g˜ ∈ G(I), X˘ = (S˘, A˘), and
X˜ = (S˜, A˜) if and only if {S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘)} and {A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘)}, (3) follows from Lemma B.6, and (4) follows
from Lemma B.7.
Lemma B.6. Fix X˘ = (S˘, A˘) ∈ X , X˜ = (S˜, A˜) ∈ X , and I ∈ I arbitrarily. Then, S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and
A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘) implies that
∑
g∈G(I) 1{gX˘ = X˜} =
∑
g∈G(I) 1{gX˘ = X˘}.
Proof. Fix X˘ = (S˘, A˘) ∈ X , X˜ ∈ X , and I ∈ I arbitrarily, and assume that S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘).
By definition of G(I), RS(I, S˘), and RA(S˜, X˘), S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘) implies that ∃g˘ ∈ G(I) s.t.
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g˘X˘ = X˜. Therefore,∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˜} (1)=
∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = g˘X˘} (2)=
∑
g∈G(I)
1{g˘−1gX˘ = X˘} (3)=
∑
g∈G(I)
1{gX˘ = X˘},
where (1) holds by g˘X˘ = X˜, (2) holds because g˘ ∈ G(I) and that G(I) is a group (by Lemma B.3), (3)
holds by {g˘−1g : g ∈ G(I)} = G(I), as G(I) is a group (again, by Lemma B.3).
Lemma B.7. Fix X˘ = (S˘, A˘) ∈ X and I ∈ I arbitrarily. Then, S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) implies that |RA(S˜, X˘)| =
|RA(S˘, X˘)|.
Proof. Fix X˘ = (S˘, A˘) ∈ X and I ∈ I arbitrarily, and assume that S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘).
We first show that |RA(S˘, (S˘, A˘))| ≤ |RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘))|. Let (A1, . . . , AC) enumerate the (distinct) elements
in RA(S˘, (S˘, A˘)). By S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and Lemma B.8, there is a permutation pi s.t S˜ = S˘pi and Acpi ∈
RA(S˜, (S˘, A
c)) for each c = 1, . . . , C. We now show that (A1pi, . . . , A
C
pi ) are all distinct elements. To this end,
suppose that ∃c1, c2 ∈ {1, . . . , C} s.t. Ac1pi = Ac2pi . If that were the case, and by the fact that a permutation is a
bijective relationship, we conclude that Ac1 = Ac2 . Since (A1, . . . , AC) are distinct, we conclude that c1 = c2,
as desired. To conclude the argument, it suffices to show that Acpi ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)) for all c = 1, . . . , C. To this
end, choose c = 1, . . . , C arbitrarily. Since S˘ ∈ RS(I, S˘) (trivially) and Ac ∈ RA(S˘, (S˘, A˘)), Definition 4.1
implies that ∃g1 ∈ G(I) s.t. g1(S˘, A˘) = (S˘, Ac). Since S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and Acpi ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, Ac)), Definition 4.1
implies that ∃g2 ∈ G(I) s.t. g2(S˘, Ac) = (S˜, Acpi). Since G(I) is a group (by Lemma B.3), we conclude that
g3 = g2 ◦g1 ∈ G(I). Since g3(S˘, A˘) = (S˜, Acpi) and g3 ∈ G(I), Definition 4.1 implies that Acpi ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)),
as desired.
We next show that |RA(S˘, (S˘, A˘))| ≥ |RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘))|. Let (A1, . . . , AC) enumerate the (distinct) elements
in RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)). Since S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and by the fact that the Definition 3.1 treats S˜ and S˘ symmetrically, we
conclude that S˘ ∈ RS(I, S˜). In turn, by S˘ ∈ RS(I, S˜) and Lemma B.8, there is a permutation pi s.t. S˘ = S˜pi
and Acpi ∈ RA(S˘, (S˜, Ac)) for each c = 1, . . . , C. By repeating the previous argument, we can show that
(A1pi, . . . , A
C
pi ) are all distinct elements. To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that A
c
pi ∈ RA(S˘, (S˘, A˘)) for
all c = 1, . . . , C. To this end, choose c = 1, . . . , C arbitrarily. Since S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘) and Ac ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)),
Definition 4.1 implies that ∃g1 ∈ G(I) s.t. g1(S˘, A˘) = (S˜, Ac). Since S˘ ∈ RS(I, S˜) and Acpi ∈ RA(S˘, (S˜, Ac)),
Definition 4.1 implies that ∃g2 ∈ G(I) s.t. g2(S˜, Ac) = (S˘, Acpi). Since G(I) is a group (by Lemma B.3),
we conclude that g3 = g2g1 ∈ G(I). Since g3(S˘, A˘) = (S˘, Acpi) and g3 ∈ G(I), Definition 4.1 implies that
Acpi ∈ RA(S˘, (S˘, A˘)), as desired.
Lemma B.8. For any S˘ ∈ SnT , I ∈ I and S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘), there exists a permutation pi : {1, . . . , n} ×
{1, . . . , T} → {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T} such that S˜ = S˘pi and A˘pi ∈ RA(S˜, (S˘, A˘)) for every A˘ ∈ AnT .
Proof. Fix S˘,∈ SnT and I ∈ I arbitrarily and assume that S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘). For every s, s′ ∈ S, let
Index1(s, s
′) = {(i, t) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T − 1} : (S˘i,t, S˘i,t+1) = (s, s′)},
Index2(s, s
′) = {(i, t) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T − 1} : (S˜i,t, S˜i,t+1) = (s, s′)},
Index1(s) = {(i, T ) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, S˘i,T = s},
Index2(s) = {(i, T ) : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, S˜i,T = s}.
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We use
C(s, s′) ≡ |Index1(s, s′)| (1)= |Index2(s, s′)|,
C(s) ≡ |Index1(s)| (2)= |Index2(s)|,
where (1) and (2) hold by S˜ ∈ RS(I, S˘).
For every s, s′ ∈ S, we can enumerate Index1(s, s′) by (ν1(1, s, s′), . . . , ν1(C(s, s′), s, s′)), Index2(s, s′) by
(ν2(1, s, s
′), . . . , ν2(C(s, s′), s, s′)), Index1(s) by (ν1(1, s), . . . , ν1(C(s), s)), and Index2(s) by (ν2(1, s), . . . , ν2(C(s), s)).
By definition, (ν1(1, s, s
′), . . . , ν1(C(s, s′), s, s′)) represent the (i, t) indices that satisfy (S˘i,t, S˘i,t+1) = (s, s′)
and (ν1(1, s), . . . , ν1(C(s), s)) represent the (i, T ) indices that satisfy S˘i,T = s, (ν2(1, s, s
′), . . . , ν2(C(s, s′), s, s′))
represent the (i, t) indices that satisfy (S˜i,t, S˜i,t+1) = (s, s
′), and (ν2(1, s), . . . , ν2(C(s), s)) represent the (i, T )
indices that satisfy S˜i,T = s.
These enumerations allows us to interpret S˘ as a permutation of the values of S˜. We denote this
permutation by pi : {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T} → {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T}, and we characterize it next. For any
(i, t) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T − 1}, there exists (s, s′) ∈ S and c = 1, . . . , C(s, s′) s.t. (i, t) = ν1(c, s, s′) ∈
Index1(s, s
′). In this case, set pi(i, t) = ν2(c, s, s′). By this construction,
S˘i,t = S˘ν1(c,s,s′) = S˜ν2(c,s,s′) = S˜pi(i,t),
Similarly, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists s ∈ S and c = 1, . . . , C(s) s.t. (i, T ) = ν1(c, s) ∈ Index1(s). In
this case, set pi(i, T ) = ν2(c, s). By this construction,
S˘i,T = S˘ν2(c,s,) = S˜ν2(c,s) = S˜pi(i,T ).
To show the second part, for any A˘ ∈ AnT , consider A˜ = A˘pi. For each s, s′ ∈ S, note that
A˜ν2(c,s,s′) = A˘ν1(c,s,s′) for c = 1, . . . , C(s, s
′)
A˜ν2(c,s) = A˘ν1(c,s) for c = 1, . . . , C(s). (B-30)
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that A˜ ∈ RA(S˜, X˘). To this end, it suffices to verify conditions
(a)-(b) in Definition 3.2. We only show condition (a), as condition (b) can be shown using an analogous
argument. For any s, s′ ∈ S and a ∈ A, consider the following derivation.
n∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˘i,t = s, A˘i,t = a, S˘i,t+1 = s′} (1)=
∑
(i,t)∈Index1(s,s′)
1{A˘i,t = a}
=
C(s,s′)∑
c=1
1{A˘ν1(c,s,s′) = a}
(2)
=
C(s,s′)∑
c=1
1{A˜ν2(c,s,s′) = a}
=
∑
(i,t)∈Index2(s,s′)
1{A˜i,t = a}
(3)
=
n∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=1
1{S˜i,t = s, A˜i,t = a, S˜i,t+1 = s′}, (B-31)
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where (1) follows from the fact that Index1(s, s
′) is the collection of all indices (i, t) ∈ {1, . . . , n}×{1, . . . , T−
1} s.t. (S˘i,t, S˘i,t+1) = (s, s′), (2) holds by (B-30), and (3) follows from the fact that Index2(s, s′) is the
collection of all indices (i, t) ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , T − 1} s.t. (S˘i,t, S˘i,t+1) = (s, s′).
Lemma B.9. The transition probability in (B-22) is symmetric, i.e., for any g, g˘ ∈ G, P (G(k+1) = g˘|G(k) =
g) = P (G(k+1) = g|G(k) = g˘).
Proof. Fix g, g˘ ∈ G arbitrarily and consider the following argument.
P (G(k+1) = g˘|G(k) = g) =
∑
I∈I
1
|I|
∑
g˜∈G(I)
1{g˘ = g˜ ◦ g}
|G(I)|
(1)
=
∑
I∈I
1
|I|
∑
g˜∈G(I)
1{g = g˜−1 ◦ g˘}
|G(I)|
(2)
=
∑
I∈I
1
|I|
∑
g˜∈G(I)
1{g = g˜ ◦ g˘}
|G(I)|
= P (G(k+1) = g|G(k) = g˘),
where (1) follows from the fact that G(I) is a group (by Lemma B.3), and so ∃g˜−1 ∈ G(I) for any g˜ ∈ G(I),
and that 1{g˘ = g˜ ◦ g} = 1{g˜−1 ◦ g˘ = g}, and (2) follows from defining G(I) = {g˜−1 : g˜ ∈ G(I)}, which holds
because G(I) is a group (again, by Lemma B.3).
References
Aguirregabiria, V. and A. Magesan (2020): “Identification and estimation of dynamic games
when players’ beliefs are not in equilibrium,” The Review of Economic Studies, 87, 582–625.
Aguirregabiria, V. and P. Mira (2002): “Swapping the Nested Fixed Point Algorithm: A
Class of Estimators for Discrete Markov Decision Models,” Econometrica, 70, 1519–1543.
——— (2007): “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games,” Econometrica, 75, 1–53.
Arcidiacono, P. and R. A. Miller (2011): “Conditional Choice Probability Estimation of
Dynamic Discrete Choice Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity,” Econometrica, 79, 1823–1867.
Bajari, P., D. Benkard, and J. Levin (2007): “Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect
Competition,” Econometrica, 75, 1331–1370.
Besag, J. and D. Mondal (2013): “Exact Goodness-of-Fit Tests for Markov Chains,” Biometrics,
69, 488–496.
Collard-Wexler, A. (2013): “Demand fluctuations in the ready-mix concrete industry,” Econo-
metrica, 81, 1003–1037.
de Paula, A. and X. Tang (2012): “Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous
Games With Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, 80, 143–172.
36
Dunne, T., S. D. Klimek, M. J. Roberts, and D. Y. Xu (2013): “Entry, exit, and the
determinants of market structure,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 44, 462–487.
Ericson, R. and A. Pakes (1995): “arkov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empir-
ical Work,” The Review of Economic Studies, 62, 53–82.
Hotz, J. V. and R. T. A. Miller (1993): “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation
of Dynamic Models,” Review of Economics Studies, 60, 497–529.
Hotz, J. V., R. T. A. Miller, S. Sanders, and J. Smith (1994): “A Simulation Estimator
for Dynamic Models of Discrete Choice,” Review of Economics Studies, 61, 265–289.
Kandel, D., M. Yossi, R. Unger, and P. Winkler (1996): “Shuffling biological sequences,”
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 71, 171–185.
Lehmann, E. L. and J. P. Romano (2005): Testing Statistical Hypothesis: Third edition,
Springer.
Maskin, E. and J. Tirole (2001): “Markov Perfect Equilibrium I: Observable Actions,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 100, 191–219.
Otsu, T., M. Pesendorfer, and Y. Takahashi (2016): “Pooling data across markets in
dynamic Markov Games,” Quantitative Economics, 7, 523–559.
Pakes, A., M. Ostrovsky, and S. Berry (2007): “Simple estimators for the parameters of
discrete dynamic games (with entry/exit examples),” RAND Journal of Economics, 38, 373–399.
Pesendorfer, M. and P. Schmidt-Dengler (2008): “Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators
for Dynamic Games,” Review of Economic Studies, 75, 901–928.
——— (2010): “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games: A Comment,” Econometrica,
78, 833–842.
Robert, C. and G. Casella (2004): Monte Carlo Statistical Methods, Springer Texts in Statis-
tics.
Rust, J. (1987): “Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold
Zurcher,” Econometrica, 55, 999–1033.
Ryan, S. (2012): “The costs of environmental regulation in a concentrated industry,” Economet-
rica, 80, 1019–1061.
Sweeting, A. (2013): “Dynamic product positioning in differentiated product markets: The
effect of fees for musical performance rights on the commercial radio industry,” Econometrica,
81, 1763–1803.
37
